HPAVC/HPAVC CD-ROM.iso/pc/HOMEWORK.ZIP/HISEPOY.TXT

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                      .THE UPRISING OF 1857.

INVESTIGATE THE CAUSES OF THE UPRISING AND CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE
TWO TERMS `MUTINY' AND `WAR OF INDEPENDENCE'. WHY DID THE BRITISH PREFER THE
TERM MUTINY? WHY DID CERTAIN INDIANS PREFER TO SEE THE INCIDENT AS A WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE? WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE UPHEAVAL?

As with any conflict or controversy there are always two sides to the debate, and the events
in India during 1857 are certainly no exception. Given the situation in India during the
nineteenth century it is hardly surprising that such a polarisation of opinion exists
regarding the context of the rebellious events during that year. The British being in
control of the subcontinent and their sense of superiority over their Indian subjects, would
naturally seek to downplay any acts of rebellion. While the Indian subjects on the other
hand would arguably wish to exaggerate and over emphasise the importance of these events, as
a means of promoting the nationalist cause for self determination. The truth of the events
themselves, does it lie towards the British account or the Indian pro nationalistic side, or
could there be a certain amount of truth in both sides of the debate.

Metcalf in his account cites three indisputable factors behind the outbreak of rebellion in
1857. Primarily he sees `accumulating grievances of the Sepoy Army of Bengal' as the most
important factor. The reasons behind this `deterioration of morale' amongst the army lay
with several reasons. Much of the Sepoy army was comprised of `Brahmins and other high caste
Hindus' who assisted in promoting a `focus of sedition'. The `generally poor standard of
British officers', plus the lack of improvement to the overall position of those men serving
in the army also increased the level of tension. At this point it should be remembered that
the `Bengal Army differed from those of Bengal and Madras', as the Bombay and Madras armies
took no part in the rebellion of 1857. But the more pronounced military factor  was the lack
of British troops in the `Gangetic plain' meant that many areas were `virtually denuded of
British troops'.

These military grievances which although significant were not themselves enough to incite
rebellion, as it took a perceived attack on the Sepoy religious institutions to trigger of
the rebellion. The first of these perceived threats was that the British government was
preparing to dismantle the caste system and `convert them forcibly to Christianity'.
Although not based on fact the actions of some `pious British officers did nothing to
dispel' the rumours to the contrary. Added to this British lethargy was the Brahmins who
tended to be `peculiarly watchful for potential threats to their religion and caste'.

Secondly, the introduction in 1857 of the `new Enfield rifle' with its distinct ammunition,
which required the bullet to be `bitten before loading'. Rumours that the grease used on the
bullets was either from the fat of cattle or pigs, which either proved `sacred to Hindus' or
`pollution to Muslims', was interpreted as attacking at the core of the Hindu and Muslim
religious beliefs. These rumours unlike those regarding the conversion to Christianity and
dismantling of the caste system, did prove to have a factual basis, as the British
government `withdrew the objectionable grease'. This belated action proved futile as the
damage had already been done.

However this only accounts for the military aspects of the uprising which display the
version of events `accepted in official circles [as] basically army mutinies'. This version
preferred by the British fails to acknowledge the level of `widespread unrest among the
civilian population', who saw much of the British government's actions as amounting to
interference and contempt for the `long established rules and customs'.

Disraeli saw the causes of the uprising as not being the `conduct of men who were ... the
exponents of general discontent' amongst the Bengal army. For Disraeli the root cause was
the overall administration by the government, which he regarded as having `alienated or
alarmed almost every influential class in the country'.

Yet other British saw the overall social situation and government administration as having
no effect in causing the uprising. For officials like Sir John Lawrence the `immediate cause
of the revolt' was the concerns held by Sepoys over the new ammunition for the Enfield
rifles. However, he sees this as just the trigger incident, with the root cause being the
long term reduction in discipline in the army and the poor standard of officers in command.

The British standpoint is to regard the events of 1857 as a mutiny. This is correct as there
was a mutiny by sections of the military, yet this fails to include the sections of the
civilian population who also engaged in civil unrest. For most of the British writers and
observers of the events, they are agreed in calling it a mutiny because of the failings of
the army, in terms of discipline and command.

The term mutiny also conjures up images of relatively small, disorganised and not very
widespread activities of disobedience towards British authority. This is a more accurate
description of the events given that the `whole of India did not participate in the
rebellion'. Added to this the `large bodies of Punjabi Sikh troops [who] served under
British command' and some `of the Indian princes' it seems hard to justify the term used by
the Indian nationalists to describe the events of 1857.

Although not accepted by all Indian historians, the traditional Indian nationalist view of
the events of 1857 are that it was not as the British believe, a series of isolated and
uncoordinated mutinies. It was a war of independence, the first act by Indians to gain self
rule. That year represented a turning point in which the `nationalist feelings, long
suppressed by the British occupation, flared into violence'. For half a century after 1857
the writing on the uprising were basically confined to British observers and scholars.

The first nationalist interpretation appeared in 1909. Savarkar is very passionate in his
pro nationalist stance, he treats with contempt the British assertion of the greased bullets
as sparking the `war'. He questions that if the bullets were the cause why did the likes of
`Nana Sahib, the Emperor of Delhi, the Queen of Jhansi ... join in'. To Savarkar the fact
that these individuals participated and the fighting continued after the `English Governor
General issued a proclamation' to withdraw the offending greased bullets, shows in his mind
the fight was for an India free from British rule. To Savarkar the real cause was the
actions of the British in having `committed so many atrocities'.

As noted by others was the objective of the Indians to stop the British in their  alleged
`wicked desire to destroy our holy religion'. The nationalists sought to `restore state
protection to Islam and Hinduism'. Savakar's rhetoric is of a somewhat ultra nationalist
standpoint, claiming God on the Indian side and national support to repel the European
invader from the sub-continent. The ability to write years after the event assists in
Savakar's ability to utilise the nationalist sentiments of his contemporary early twentieth
century campaign to promote this event from half a century earlier as the foundations of the
nationalist movement.

Another view by Joshi adds to the nationalist picture of the tremendous detrimental effect
the British had on India's people and civilization. Joshi regards the events of 1857 as
certainly being a war, but he sees it as being more than a war of independence, it was a
`social revolution'. To both Joshi and Savakar the British were suppressing the truth of the
uprising, the British `exaggerated and deliberately misrepresented the role played'  by
religious factors. They used this argument as a means of further control and repression of
the Indian people after 1857. Joshi is highly critical of the `English educated Indian
intellectuals' for maintaining the British lie, who he regards as having `swallowed this
imperialist thesis uncritically'.

One view which leans towards the side if interpreting the events of 1857 as a war of
independence, rather than a  mutiny, is that of Gupta. Although he takes a less nationalist
and more balanced approach. He argued the name of the events, which is what parties for both
sides have continuously argued over, are entitled to be called the `Great Indian Outbreak'.
For Gupta the name is not being pro Indian nationalist in the description of the events,
which he regards as having `possessed the hallmarks of a truly national uprising'. He sought
to equate these events on an equal footing with European events of a similar nature. `If the
limited and unfruitful results of 1830 and 1848 in Central and Southern European countries
have been regarded as national uprisings', Gupta sees the Indians as justifiably giving the
events of 1857 a similar title.

The two accounts by Joshi and Savarkar are certainly for the pro-nationalist movement, who
of course would wish to portray the events of 1857 in a light that was directed towards the
nationalist movement's objectives. Gupta although eluding to this viewpoint is far less pro
nationalist and more balanced in his approach.

As Metcalf points out the `most pervasive legacy of the mutiny can be found perhaps in the
sphere of human relations'. Quite simply the way in which the British and Indians
interacted, was especially the way the British felt towards the Indians altered markedly.
While there is no question concerning the British as the rulers of India for a century, the
manner of administration prior to the mutiny of 1857 was less as the role of overlord. After
the mutiny it became much sterner with the British acting as `clearly an occupying power,
garrisoning a hostile land'. The British saw the need to reduce the risk of a second
rebellion and to reduce the prospect the `Government of India adopted the policy of creating
division and disunion in the civil ranks'.

In terms of interaction the mutiny saw `the romanticism of orientalists and the optimism of
reformers [giving] way to a pessimistic stance that emphasised military security and
cautious policies'. This saw the British drift `into insular little communities'. As part of
this different military and administrative approach there was a significant restructuring of
the military, `the Indian element in the army was drastically reduced (from 238,000 in 1857
to 140,000 in 1863) and the European part increased (from 45,000 to 65,000)'. As part of
restructuring personnel numbers, ratios were introduced where in the `Punjab the ratio of
British to native troops should normally be one to two, ... [while] in Bombay and Madras ...
one to three'. In an attempt to further reduce any chance of another mutiny occurring the
`native Artillery was abolished ... [and] the corps of Bengal, Madras and Bombay Artillery
and Engineers were amalgamated with the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers'.

The decades prior to the mutiny saw no attempts by the British to classify the Indians into
`racial categories or rank them as superior or inferior'. But by the middle of the
nineteenth century the divisions of `race was a popular topic in Victorian England'. The
concept of superiority and inferiority reached such levels that the `concept of permanent
racial superiority ... underlay much of post-Mutiny British thought about India'.

The basis for these views were no longer regarded as simply being `emotional sentiment, it
was a scientific fact', or more accurately pseudo-science. While the theories of racial
superiority were nothing new to the people of Victorian England. The racially based ideas
were given much greater credence to those who supported them, by the `publication in 1859 of
Charles Darwin's, Origin of the Species [which] accelerated this shift from the
commonalities of the human race to a differentiation of races'.

These racially based beliefs in superiority and inferiority were the basis, for the
supporters of such beliefs, in the  reason behind the British victory  in 1857, as the
`white race was dominant because it was more advanced and adaptable'. The moves by the
British towards acknowledging the various racial groups in India and therefore the qualities
of each was an area which having been neglected before the mutiny became an area of keen
interest. The `martial races became a concern immediately after the outbreak of the Sepoy
Rebellion'. The British administration the `Peel Commission concluded ... had been unaware
of the true martial attributes possessed by various Indian ethnic groups'.

The willingness of the British to admit to the beneficial qualities of certain ethnic groups
showed that, although they did not regard such groups as being anywhere near the equal of
the white race. They could be categorised as being the superior members of an inferior race.
 The findings of the inquiry saw the British place certain racial groups out of favour,
while providing greater acceptance of others.

The Brahmins were characterised as `scheming and dishonest', and it was the `high caste
Hindus of Oudh and neighbouring areas ... adjudged responsible for the undermining of
discipline of the sepoys of the Native Army'. While others like the `Guhkas, Sikhs, Marathas
and Rajputs ... understood the meaning of honour, and duty', therefore the British
administrators saw these races as being `India's truly martial peoples'. The recruitment
into the army of members of these social groups was made government policy and `a series of
handbooks on the martial races [produced] for the benefit of recruiting officers'.

Aside from the overall deterioration in relations between the British and their Indian
subjects after the rebellion, there was also an impact on the Indians themselves. With the
Muslims losing much of the influence and power they held before the rebellion, and the
Hindus filling the vacuum left by the Muslims. While the British attitude changed radically
towards the Indians the `most bitter and widespread hostility was reserved for the Muslim
community'. They were blamed by the British for much of the rebellious activity, which the
British saw as an attempt to `restore the authority of the Moghul emperor'.

Because `Muslims stood prejudiced against western education' they `had to remain in the
background for some time', while the Hindus who were more favourable in the adoption of this
western style of education and learning English benefited under the government. An example
which shows how the Muslims declined so heavily and the Hindus benefited after the mutiny,
is in the case of  `judicial positions open to Indians'. `Although Muslims comprised only 12
per cent  of the population in the North Western Provinces, they held 72 per cent of
positions' prior to 1857. The post 1857 effects saw this disproportionate share of judicial
position diminish to a situation where in `1886 they could claim only 9 posts out of a total
of 284'. This situation of a Muslim decline in influence had long term effects on the Muslim
community right up until the early part of the twentieth century.

As each side of the debate is so fixed in their opinion on this subject that no consensus
ever seems likely to be reached. For the Indians the events assist in enhancing the
nationalist theme of ridding the sub-continent of the British. To the nationalists the
events of 1857 are the first step in a process that took ninety years to achieve the goal of
an India ruled by Indians. However the evidence of the events clearly comes down on the side
of the British opinion. The events were not a war of independence but a military and
civilian mutiny.

Given that the `entire south of India took no part in the rebellion' it seems impossible to
justify the claim that the events were a war of independence. Added to this, the assistance
provided by certain elements of Indian society to the British further  reduces the
nationalist claims. The lack of central co-ordination amongst the rebels hardly inspires
confidence in them engaging in a conflict to gain independence. Clearly the debate comes
closer to the British viewpoint of 1857 being a year of  mutinies in the Indian
sub-continent, and not the first attempts by the Indians to seek independence.